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A B S T R A C T
Background: Drug policy, whether for legal or illegal substances, is a controversial ﬁeld that encompasses many
complex issues. Policies can have eﬀects on a myriad of outcomes and stakeholders diﬀer in the outcomes they
consider and value, while relevant knowledge on policy eﬀects is dispersed across multiple research disciplines
making integrated judgements diﬃcult.
Methods: Experts on drug harms, addiction, criminology and drug policy were invited to a decision conference to
develop a multi-criterion decision analysis (MCDA) model for appraising alternative regulatory regimes.
Participants collectively deﬁned regulatory regimes and identiﬁed outcome criteria reﬂecting ethical and nor-
mative concerns. For cannabis and alcohol separately, participants evaluated each regulatory regime on each
criterion and weighted the criteria to provide summary scores for comparing diﬀerent regimes.
Results: Four generic regulatory regimes were deﬁned: absolute prohibition, decriminalisation, state control and
free market. Participants also identiﬁed 27 relevant criteria which were organised into seven thematically re-
lated clusters. State control was the preferred regime for both alcohol and cannabis. The ranking of the regimes
was robust to variations in the criterion-speciﬁc weights.
Conclusion: The MCDA process allowed the participants to deconstruct complex drug policy issues into a set of
simpler judgements that led to consensus about the results.
Introduction
Substance use can cause harms to individuals and societies, but
opinions diﬀer regarding how these harms are best reduced. Such
opinions will also reﬂect how we view trade-oﬀs, as policies need to
balance the harms of use against negative consequences of restrictive
policies and the pleasures and beneﬁts that the majority of users may
claim to experience. Over time, and across regions, policies – even for
the same substance – have ranged from strict prohibitions criminalising
production and consumption to relatively unregulated commercial
markets. In recent years, policy changes in US states, Uruguay and
Canada have fuelled a growing debate on whether cannabis supply and
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2018.01.019
Received 3 November 2017; Received in revised form 8 January 2018; Accepted 25 January 2018
⁎ Corresponding author at: Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, Gaustadalléen 21, 0349 Oslo, Norway.
E-mail addresses: ole.rogeberg@frisch.uio.no (O. Rogeberg), daniel.bergsvik@fhi.no (D. Bergsvik), larry_phillips@msn.com (L.D. Phillips),
jan.van.amsterdam@amc.uva.nl (J. van Amsterdam), niamh@release.org.uk (N. Eastwood), graeme.henderson@bris.ac.uk (G. Henderson), michael.lynskey@kcl.ac.uk (M. Lynskey),
f.measham@durham.ac.uk (F. Measham), r.ponton@auckland.ac.nz (R. Ponton), steve@tdpf.org.uk (S. Rolles), anne.schlag@kcl.ac.uk (A.K. Schlag),
polly@taylormonroe.co.uk (P. Taylor), d.nutt@imperial.ac.uk (D. Nutt).
International Journal of Drug Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
0955-3959/ © 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY-NC-ND/4.0/).
Please cite this article as: Rogeberg, o., International Journal of Drug Policy (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2018.01.019
consumption should be legalised and, if so, how strictly it should be
regulated (Caulkins & Kilmer, 2016; Hawken, Caulkins, Kilmer, &
Kleiman, 2013; Room, 2014; Uchtenhagen, 2014). The appropriate
balance between “free market” and “government control” also remains
an issue for alcohol, with a current example being the debate over
minimum unit pricing (Holmes et al., 2014; Stockwell, Auld, Zhao, &
Martin, 2012). Public health arguments are frequently emphasised in
these discussions (Hall & Degenhardt, 2009; Hall & Lynskey, 2016;
Room, Babor, & Rehm, 2005) with a particular focus on adolescent use
(Hasin et al., 2015; Simons-Morton, Pickett, Boyce, ter Bogt, &
Vollebergh, 2010), while other concerns include social consequences
(Klingemann & Gmel, 2001; Laslett et al., 2011) and crime and crim-
inalisation (Csete et al., 2016a; MacCoun & Reuter, 2001).
Identifying an optimal policy for a substance involves three con-
ceptually distinct steps: I) deﬁning the available policy options, II)
deﬁning the outcomes of importance and the criteria against which
policies should be evaluated, and III) assessing each policy option
against each criterion, taking into account how the policy will inﬂuence
the relevant outcomes.
This is a cognitively complex task: criteria need to reﬂect the con-
cerns of a broad set of policy stakeholders including not just health and
legal experts but also people who use drugs, their neighbours, and the
broader national and international society. Judgments regarding the
impact of regulatory regimes on outcomes involve assembling knowl-
edge from a broad set of disciplines including medicine, economics,
criminology and sociology. Trade-oﬀs between diﬀerent outcomes re-
quire the combination, weighting and integration of judgments across
all concerns.
Faced with complex issues, individuals will often answer a simpler
substitute question or problem using mental rules of thumb (heuristics)
instead, usually without noticing the substitution (Kahneman, 2011).
Given the complexity of drug policy, this means that surveys of people’s
opinions are unlikely to uncover well-constructed, informed pre-
ferences: the responses will most likely ignore choice options, disregard
most concerns or outcomes, depend on prior beliefs and easily available
information, and attempt to avoid facing trade-oﬀs (Payne, Bettman,
Schkade, Schwarz, & Gregory, 1999). In addition, people’s stated beliefs
regarding the eﬀects of diﬀerent drug policies may themselves serve
primarily as expressions of cultural and political identity (Kahan,
2016a, 2016b). As a result, individuals are likely to express policy views
that are sensitive to decision-irrelevant factors, and potentially based
on false beliefs regarding both the consequences of drug use (beneﬁts,
risks and harms) and the likely consequences of drug policy regimes.1
Structured decision making processes can be thought of as tools
developed to help individuals and groups develop “well-constructed
preferences.” These are defensible, considered judgments arrived at
through a structured, systematic process designed to assist decision-
makers in clarifying options and choice criteria, breaking complex
judgments down into simpler issues, and helping participants access
and integrate relevant information.
This study aimed to develop an analytical framework to describe,
assess and discuss diﬀerent drug regulatory regimes for a Western
context (Western Europe and North-America). To do this, we convened
a decision conference over two one-and-a-half day sessions to run a
multi-criterion decision analysis (MCDA), an established and well-re-
searched decision making process (Phillips, 2007) previously applied to
subjects ranging from nuclear waste management (Morton, Airoldi, &
Phillips, 2009) to the risk-beneﬁt ratio of prescription drugs (Hughes
et al., 2016). Participants were experts on the harms of drugs, addic-
tion, criminology and drug policy. Employing the MCDA process, the
participants deﬁned policy options and assessment criteria, and eval-
uated each policy option on each criterion for diﬀerent drugs. By
combining data and expert judgments to assess real and hypothetical
policy states, this new approach can contribute to the literature on
comparative policy analysis (Ritter, Livingston, Chalmers, Berends, &
Reuter, 2016).
Methods
Study design
Expert participants with varied relevant backgrounds (Panel 1) at-
tended two MCDA sessions (September 10–11th 2015, January 20–21st
2016) to compare alternative drug policies in a Western context. The
sessions were facilitated by Lawrence Phillips, an independent specia-
list in decision analysis modelling, and David Nutt, a medical re-
searcher, and employed decision making software (LSE/Catalyze, 2016)
to build, reﬁne and score a model which was projected on a screen in
full view of all participants.
Panel 1. Facilitators and participating experts in the drug policy MCDA workshop.
1 Arguably, government decision-making suﬀers from similar issues, with drug policies
ignoring established research (Rogeberg, 2015) unless it conforms to implicit and un-
stated assumptions (MacCoun & Reuter, 2008). Stevens (2011) provides an ethnographic
study of how “evidence” is used selectively to support persuasive policy stories in line
with unstated ideological principles − see also Stevens and Measham (2014).
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The MCDA process provides a ﬂexible framework for comparing
policy options in terms of their expected impact on valued outcomes in
complex situations with limited knowledge. An MCDA model a) lists
and deﬁnes a set of concerns that a policy should address, b) lists and
deﬁnes a set of policy options to compare, c) assesses how the diﬀerent
policy options address the concerns, and d) speciﬁes the relative im-
portance of the diﬀerent concerns. Both data and expert judgments can
be used, with expert judgments elicited where data are inadequate or
missing. As a result, MCDA models are often best developed in fa-
cilitated workshops with issue experts, exposing claims and judgments
to multiple perspectives and providing an internal “peer-review” and a
structured process for resolving diﬀerences in perspective.
At the ﬁrst two-day meeting, participants developed a set of criteria
for assessing drug policy outcomes, deﬁned a set of four generic drug
regulatory regimes, and piloted the decision model by applying it to
alcohol. Following this ﬁrst meeting, a summary document was pro-
duced and distributed to the participants, who were encouraged to
reﬂect on the outcome and consider possible reﬁnements to the policy
regimes and criteria. At the second two-day meeting, participants re-
ﬁned the decision model further, and decided to begin with a re-as-
sessment of alcohol before moving on to cannabis. Finally, the same
model was applied to heroin, for which results will be reported in a
follow-up paper.
Deﬁning outcome criteria and drug regulatory regimes
Participants were presented at the ﬁrst meeting with a preliminary
strategy table of policy options, developed to focus initial discussions
(see table S1 in supporting materials). Working in groups, participants
assessed how societal outcomes would be aﬀected by diﬀerent levels of
control/regulation for alcohol and tobacco as contrasted to heroin and
cannabis. Based on these group inputs, participants collectively
extracted and reﬁned a set of criteria against which drug policies could
be appraised. These reﬂected diﬀerent ethical and normative concerns
held by participants and often familiar from ongoing policy debates,
and resulted in 27 criteria grouped into seven thematic clusters
(Table 1). The cluster headings served as prompts that helped partici-
pants identify a complete set of criteria within each heading. The
headings also reduced the cognitive complexity of a later stage in the
process where participants speciﬁed the relative weight of diﬀerent
criteria.
Based on the established criteria and the discussions about the
policy strategy table, participants next deﬁned a set of four regulatory
regimes diﬀering in both the legal status of the drug and its use, the
balance of state regulation and commercialisation in legal markets, and
the type and intensity of punitive sanctions.
After reﬂecting on the outcomes from the pilot results from the ﬁrst
session, participants reﬁned the policy regimes and criteria at the start
of the second meeting. One outcome was that all criteria were reworded
to avoid reverse scoring. For instance, the criteria “harms to user”,
which deals with the medical harms resulting from the use patterns
expected under a given regulatory regime, was speciﬁed as “prevents
medical harms”.
Scoring policy regimes on the criteria
The four separate policy regimes were evaluated in two separate
stages for each substance assessed: scoring the policy regimes on each
criterion separately, and then adjusting the weights across diﬀerent
criteria to reﬂect their relative importance. This makes the units of
measurement comparable, which enables trade-oﬀs across diﬀerent
concerns.
For any single criterion, for example “health harms to users”, the
four policy regimes were scored from 0 (least preferred option) to 100
Table 1
Policy criteria and their deﬁnitions.
Cluster Criterion Deﬁnition
Health Reduces user harms Prevents medical harms to a user resulting from consumption of intended substance; includes blood-borne viruses (BBV)
Reduces harms to others Prevents health harms (including BBVs) to third parties due to either indirect exposure (e.g., second hand smoking) and
behavioural responses to consumption (e.g., injury due to alcohol induced violence)
Shifts use to lower-harm products Decreases consumption of more harmful substances or increases consumption of less harmful substances (e.g., cannabis
prohibition leading to synthetic cannabinoids)
Encourages treatment Encourages treatment of substance-use problems
Improves product quality Assures the quality of products due to mislabelled or counterfeit/adulterated product, unknown dose/purity
Social Promotes drug education Improves education about drugs
Enables medical use Policy does not impede medical use
Promotes/supports research Policy does not impede research
Protects human rights Policy does not interfere with human rights as distinct from the individual’s right to use.
Promotes individual liberty Policy does not interfere with individual liberty (individual’s right to use)
Improves community cohesion Policy does not undermine social cohesion in communities
Promotes family cohesion Policy does not undermine family cohesion
Political Supports international development/
security
Policy does not undermine international development and security
Reduces industry inﬂuence Impedes drug industry inﬂuence on governments (less lobbying is preferable)
Public Promotes well-being Promotes social and personal well-being
Protects the young Protects children and young people
Protects vulnerable Protects vulnerable groups other than children and young people
Respects religious/cultural values Respects religious or cultural values
Crime Reduces criminalisation of users Does not criminalise users
Reduces acquisitive crime Reduces acquisitive crime to ﬁnance use
Reduces violent crime Reduces violent crime due to illegal markets
Prevents corporate crime Prevents corporate crime, e.g. money-laundering, tax evasion
Prevents criminal industry Extent to which the policy discourages illegal market activity
Economic Generates state revenue Generates state revenue
Reduces economic costs Reduces public ﬁnancial costs not directly related to the enforcement policy (e.g., spillover eﬀects on health policy
budgets)
Cost Low policy introduction costs Financial costs of introducing the policy
Low policy maintenance costs Financial costs of enforcing the policy
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(most preferred option). This deﬁned an interval scale that was used to
assess the remaining two policy regimes. To illustrate: if three policies
are scored at 0, 80 and 100, this means that moving from the ﬁrst of
these to the second (an increase of 80 points) is valued four times as
much as moving from the second to the third (an increase of 20 points).
In this way, each criterion-speciﬁc scale measures the relative strength
of preference across the four policies.
The scoring process asked participants to «think, reveal, discuss»
(Gustafson, Shukla, Delbecq, & Walster, 1973), such that participants
ﬁrst made an independent judgment before engaging in a discussion
converging on a common judgment. If a participant disagreed with the
collective judgment, they were asked to record their concern so that the
importance of this disagreement for overall evaluations could be as-
sessed at a later stage in the process. In practice, this part of the process
involved lengthy discussion converging to consensus.
Weighting of the criteria
Some criteria matter more than others, either because they reﬂect
more highly valued outcomes, or because the outcomes they consider
vary more across policies. Each criterion-speciﬁc scale in the decision
model was, therefore, weighted to reﬂect relative importance.
At the beginning of the weighting process, each criterion has its own
0–100 scale. A shift from 0 to 100 on one scale may be valued quite
diﬀerently to a 0 to 100 shift on another scale, just as a diﬀerence of ten
on the imperial scale (inches) fails to match a diﬀerence of ten on the
metric scale (centimetres). To make scores on diﬀerent scales compar-
able, the diﬀerent scales are converted to a single standard. This was
performed in two steps – ﬁrst within and then across criteria clusters
(shown in Table 1). In each case it involved a compound judgment on
how strongly some outcome diﬀered across policies, and on how im-
portant this outcome was relative to others.
Consistency checking was an important part of this process, by
changing the speciﬁc comparisons made and assessing weights assigned
at earlier stages. For instance, if two scales have both been scaled to
0–20 at earlier stages in the weighting, participants may be asked
whether the shift from “worst to best” on these two criteria seem
comparable. In this way, the MCDA process works to increase the
consistency of judgments made at diﬀerent stages of the process.
Results
Regulatory regimes
The group developed four policy regimes: absolute prohibition,
decriminalisation, state control and free market (Panel 2). These were
intended to encompass a broad spectrum of general approaches to
controlling drugs that are deployed in practice. The regimes were de-
ﬁned in terms of the type of policy tools employed and available within
each regulatory regime. We avoided more detailed speciﬁcation of how
the available policy tools would be applied to retain ﬂexibility and
make the regimes generally applicable across diﬀerent drugs. For in-
stance, requiring that «state control» involve restrictions to reduce
«second hand smoking» might make sense for cannabis, but not alcohol.
Drug policy evaluation criteria
The reﬁned model ﬁnalised during the second session involved 27
criteria, organised into seven thematically related clusters (Table 1).
The criteria represent an attempt to recognise desirable and undesirable
consequences of drug use, drug markets and drug policies, from the
perspective of users, their surroundings and broader society.
Policy evaluations for alcohol and cannabis
Overall preference values for each of the four regulatory regimes,
Panel 2. Deﬁnitions of alternative regulatory regimes from drug policy MCDA.
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scored on a 0–100 scale, are shown in Figs. 1 and 2 respectively. These
show the relative preference weight for regulatory regimes for each
drug respectively, but are not comparable across substances as the
preference scales are substance speciﬁc and not equated across the
substances. For both substances, state control was the most preferred
and absolute prohibition the least preferred regulatory regime, whereas
a free market was preferred over decriminalisation for cannabis, but not
alcohol. Reasons for these diﬀerences are discussed below (see “Eva-
luation of policies” in “Discussion” section).
To better understand these overall judgments, we compared two
policy regimes and identiﬁed the speciﬁc criteria that made a diﬀer-
ence. As shown in Fig. 1 for alcohol, there was a 35-point diﬀerence
between the total scores for absolute prohibition and state control. This
overall diﬀerence in scores can be broken down into the diﬀerences on
each of the criteria – expressed in terms of the weighted preference
units. These scores are shown in Fig. 3, which orders the 27 criteria by
the extent to which they tilt the overall judgment for alcohol policy
towards state control relative to absolute prohibition: the four strongest
factors are the avoidance of criminalising users, the generation of state
revenues, the avoidance of a criminal industry, and better community
cohesion. These four contribute 75% of the 35-point diﬀerence fa-
vouring state control over prohibition. Since prohibition was expected
to reduce consumption, however, both medical harms to users, eco-
nomic impacts (e.g., health care costs) and harm to others (e.g., alcohol
induced violence or drunk driving) pull in favour of prohibition. In
addition, prohibition was seen as favoured on the criteria of reducing
industry inﬂuence on the state.
For cannabis (Fig. 4), the four strongest factors favouring state
control over absolute prohibition were improved community cohesion,
reduced harms from more harmful substances (e.g. synthetic cannabi-
noids or “spice”), medical use and family cohesion. These four, how-
ever, contributed only 35% of the weighted diﬀerence score, as a larger
number of criteria contributed substantially in the direction of state
control relative to that seen for alcohol. The judgments for cannabis
also diﬀered in that only one criterion was seen as favouring absolute
prohibition over state markets (less industry inﬂuence).
A second contrast compares state control with free market regimes.
In this comparison, the criteria that pull towards state control are more
similar across the two substances although their relative importance
diﬀers somewhat (see Figs. S1 and S2 in Supplementary information).
For both, however, important beneﬁts of a state control regime relative
to a free market is that state control was judged to reduce harm to users,
protect children and the young as well as vulnerable groups, improve
family and community cohesion, and generate state revenue. The cri-
teria that pulled overall judgments towards a free market were similar
for cannabis and alcohol, in that a state control regime costs more to
implement, criminalises some users and may lead to some illicit supply
that circumvents taxes and regulations.
A third contrast compares state control to a decriminalisation regime.
As in the comparison with absolute prohibition, the beneﬁts of state
control are more concentrated in a few outcome dimensions for alcohol
relative to what we see for cannabis (see Figs. S3 and S4 in
Supplementary information). For alcohol, the net beneﬁt of state control
in this comparison is 25 points, and the top four categories collectively
contribute 19 points – about 75% of the net beneﬁt. For cannabis, the net
beneﬁt of state control is 63 and the top four categories collectively
contribute only 22–or less than a third of the net beneﬁt. The ranking of
the categories in this comparison are similar to what was seen in the
comparison of state control and absolute prohibition.
Sensitivity analyses
Alcohol policy was assessed twice: during the ﬁrst session and again
during the second with revised criteria and regulatory regime deﬁni-
tions. The rescoring and reweighting of regulatory regimes for alcohol
were undertaken without reference to the initial scores. The judgments
made on the two separate occasions resulted in largely similar scores
across free market (35 on the ﬁrst occasion vs 43 on the second), state
control (77 vs 76), decriminalisation (55 vs. 51) and absolute prohibi-
tion (40 vs. 41).
These overall scores are calculated using the relative weights as-
signed to the diﬀerent criteria. This allows us to assess sensitivity of the
results by examining how sensitive the policy ranking is to changes in
the criteria weights. This can be done using the swing weight, deﬁned
as the value diﬀerence of moving from the least to the most preferred
policy on a speciﬁc criterion, measured on the normalised, common
scale. If a swing weight is doubled, this means that the criterion be-
comes twice as important relative to the other concerns. In this way, we
can ask “how much more weight would someone have to give some
criterion in order for the overall ranking of policy regimes to change?”
Changes in the swing weight can be assessed for either individual
criteria (e.g., harms to user) or for clustered criteria (e.g., all ﬁve health
outcomes collectively).
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Health Impact
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Fig. 2. Cannabis–Overall preference values across regimes. Displays weighted ad-
vantages.
Fig. 1. Alcohol–Overall preference values across regimes. Displays weighted advantages.
O. Rogeberg et al. International Journal of Drug Policy xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
5
Starting with the assessment of criteria clusters, the free market
would become the preferred policy alternative if the relative im-
portance of economic costs was increased six-fold or if the weighting of
crime fourfold. By contrast, roughly tripling the weight given to health
impact (from a swing weight of 28 to 80) would make absolute pro-
hibition preferable. Adjusting the weight on the remaining categories
(social impact, public impact and economic impact) did not aﬀect the
overall preference for state control.
For cannabis, the only preferences able to shift the preferred policy
were the preferences for concerns relating to either crime or costs. The
free market would become preferable to state control if the weight on
crime was quadrupled or if costs were given 15 times its current weight.
Sensitivity analyses were also performed on the weight for each of
the 27 individual criteria, showing similar results, with state control
remaining the preferred option even over large increases in the weight
for any criterion.
Discussion
Criteria for assessing drug policy
Individuals and stakeholder groups will diﬀer in the weight they
give to diﬀerent concerns and values when assessing drug policies. The
discussions amongst the participants highlighted that many of these
issues have a signiﬁcant moral dimension. Scientists, in the words of a
public health oriented review of drug policy research, “have no more
standing than anyone else in a society to say which speciﬁc outcomes a
society should care about the most, or whether such outcomes are bad,
good, or indiﬀerent” (Babor, 2010, p. 251).
The list of 27 criteria developed in the MCDA process should be seen
in this light: they represent an attempt to list exhaustively the main
concerns and values raised in drug policy debates, while recognising
that diﬀerent individuals or groups may care more about diﬀerent
subsets or diﬀer in their relative weighting of criteria.
In the decision-making process, the main purpose of these criteria is
to help break a complex judgment down into a series of judgments on
smaller, more easily assessed issues. In facing complex decisions, there
is a risk that individuals pick a very small set of criteria as “the most
important” and use these exclusively to evaluate options (Payne,
Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). This may lead to extreme solutions that fail
to address the full set of relevant trade-oﬀs. For example, focusing too
narrowly on prevalence of use might lead to strict prohibition, harsh
penalties, and an over-emphasis on abstinence-based interventions over
harm reduction. Focusing only on personal liberty, on the other hand,
might lead to laissez faire policies with large increases in harmful use,
dependence, and their concomitant consequences for health, families
and communities.
In addition, the criteria list has a broader utility beyond the deci-
sion-making process. First, the list can help prompt researchers to ad-
dress a larger set of outcomes when assessing the likely consequences of
diﬀerent policies. This can mitigate the risk that researchers focus lar-
gely on the concerns and values emphasised in their own ﬁelds, social
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Reduces criminalisation of users
Generates state revenue
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Improves community cohesion
Shifts use to lower-harm products
Low policy maintenance costs
Protects vulnerable
Promotes family cohesion
Promotes well-being
Reduces violent crime
Encourages treatment
Prevents corporate crime
Protects human rights
Improves product quality
Promotes individual liberty
Protects the young
Promotes/supports research
Reduces acquisitive crime
Promotes drug education
Respects religious/cultural values
Low policy introduction costs
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Reduces user harms
Reduces economic costs
Reduces harms to others
Alcohol 
Fig. 3. Alcohol–Comparison of state control to absolute prohibition. The criteria (as deﬁned in Table 1) sorted for alcohol in order of the advantages of State control over absolute
prohibition, as given by the weighted diﬀerence between their input scores. The green bars show the magnitude of the impacts favouring State control, while the red bars favour
prohibition. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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groups or by their funding sources, which could inﬂuence the conclu-
sions and implications drawn from the research base (Rogeberg, 2015).
Second, the criteria list may assist ongoing eﬀorts to improve the
empirical indicators used to assess and monitor ongoing policy eﬀorts.
These have been criticised as being narrow and focused on prevalence
of use (LSE, 2016; Reuter, 2013), and proposals drawing on diﬀerent
frameworks have been proposed (Longshore, Reuter, Derks,
Grapendaal, & Ebener, 1998; MacCoun, Reuter, & Schelling, 1996;
Sevigny & Saisana, 2013). The criteria list could serve as an alternative
framework from which to develop a set of indicators, or alternatively as
a checklist for assessing the coverage of proposed indicator sets.
Evaluation of policies
Through the MCDA process, the expert panel concluded that a
regulatory regime with legal but regulated access would oﬀer the best
approach to reducing the overall net harms from alcohol and from
cannabis use in Western European societies. Applied to the UK, for
example, this would imply a stricter regulation of alcohol, with stronger
emphasis on regulatory controls such as those supported by the World
Health Organization (WHO): higher taxes, limited marketing and state
owned or regulated sales outlets (WHO, 2010). Cannabis, on the other
hand, would be shifted from strict prohibition into a legalised but si-
milarly restrictive regulated regime to that recommended for alcohol.
These results have obvious and important implications for current
debates regarding the future of cannabis and alcohol policy. For
alcohol, the conclusions are in line with existing recommendations from
public health agencies and the medical establishment (Babor et al.,
2003; WHO, 2010). For cannabis, public health researchers have typi-
cally refrained from suggesting legalisation (e.g., Babor, 2010), though
this may be changing (Csete et al., 2016b; Godlee & Hurley, 2016). Our
analysis suggests that the issues are similar and the conclusion the same
for alcohol and cannabis. The asymmetry in how these topics are
treated may reﬂect the current status quo: whereas alcohol tends to be
available through commercialised legal markets with excessive use and
health impact, cannabis tends to be available through criminal markets
with lower use but harms from criminalisation. Since the main beneﬁts
to liberalising cannabis policy are a reduction in non-medical harms
(e.g., criminalisation), this policy change may go “against the grain” of
a public health approach focused on health harms.
Although state control was the preferred option for both drugs, the
results indicate that legal access regimes (i.e. free market and state
control) were more consistently and clearly preferred for cannabis than
for alcohol. This reﬂects the greater harms to self and others resulting
from alcohol use relative to cannabis (Nutt, King, & Phillips, 2010),
which means that increased consumption within a free market would be
more harmful and damaging for alcohol than for cannabis. This dif-
ference in harm had a broad impact across the criteria clusters covering
health, public and economic impacts. For cannabis, participants ex-
pected legal access regimes to see consumption shift from smoking to
less harmful delivery systems involving edibles, vaporisers and «e-ci-
garettes», a shift away from low-CBD/high THC variants thought to
-2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0
Improves community cohesion
Shifts use to lower-harm products
Enables medical use
Promotes family cohesion
Reduces criminalisation of users
Reduces criminal industry
Reduces user harms
Improves product quality
Protects human rights
Protects vulnerable
Promotes/supports research
Promotes well-being
Protects the young
Generates state revenue
Promotes individual liberty
Encourages treatment
Low policy maintenance costs
Promotes drug education
Prevents corporate crime
Reduces violent crime
Supports international development/security
Reduces harms to others
Respects religious/cultural values
Reduces acquisitive crime
Reduces economic costs
Low policy introduction costs
Reduces industry influence
Cannabis
Fig. 4. Cannabis–Comparison of state control to absolute prohibition. The criteria (as deﬁned in Table 1) sorted for cannabis in order of the advantages of State control over absolute
prohibition, as given by the weighted diﬀerence between their input scores. The green bars show the magnitude of the impacts favouring State control, while the red bar favours
prohibition. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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involve higher health risks, and a reduction in use of more harmful
«synthetic» cannabinoids. These eﬀects would to some extent coun-
teract harms from potentially increased consumption expected under
legal access regimes.
Limitations
The outcome of an MCDA process is necessarily inﬂuenced by the
participant group, their knowledge and beliefs, though past research
has found that answers from diﬀerent groups of experts correlate highly
when addressing the same question. Strikingly, a replication of the
MCDA drug harm ratings using European experts to partially rescore
and completely reweight a model previously scored in a UK context
reported a correlation of the overall rankings of 0.99 (van Amsterdam,
Nutt, Phillips, & van den Brink, 2015).
Since the current process was applied to an often-contentious policy
question, the results may to some extent reﬂect the speciﬁc composition
of the group. Ideally, such a group should contain representatives from
the “full” set of relevant research disciplines (to ensure that diﬀerent
parts of the knowledge base are represented and drawn on in the dis-
cussion), as well as representatives from important stakeholder groups
(to ensure that diﬀerent policy preferences and concerns are re-
presented and reﬂected in the ﬁnal result). Identifying the set of con-
cerns and the domains of expertise required, however, was in itself part
of what the workshop was aiming to do. This means that our participant
panel to some extent represents a “convenience panel” of experts and
stakeholder representatives given the constraints of our budget and
project timeline. Future studies may consider using the identiﬁed con-
cerns and issues to implement a more structured and systematic re-
cruitment of relevant participants.
It is worth noting, however, that the conclusions reached are similar
to those reported from an interdisciplinary group of 19 Canadian ex-
perts and knowledge users (Kirst et al., 2015). Discussing a common
public-health oriented framework for cannabis, alcohol and cigarettes,
the Canadian group note the importance of balancing the social harms
of criminalisation with the harms of use, and argue that “state-centred
legal regulation” seemed to provide the best regulatory approach. A
related exercise from a group of US-based researchers restricted
themselves to considering alternative legal regimes for cannabis, ar-
guing strongly for a regime with strong government regulation (Pacula,
Kilmer, Wagenaar, Chaloupka, & Caulkins, 2014).
A larger and more expansive MCDA process could assess this issue
further by involving a larger group of experts and stakeholder groups.
The UK Committee on radioactive waste management (CoRWM) may
serve as an illustration of such an approach (Morton et al., 2009). In this
process, the public were consulted about their issues and concerns,
experts for each cluster of criteria translated the public’s views into
workable criteria. The scoring was undertaken by relevant experts,
while the criteria weights were set by the CoRWM committee members,
taking account of swing-weights generated by diﬀerent constituencies
(old people, young people, nuclear activists, etc.). While we would
welcome a similar approach on the drug policy issue, this was beyond
the scope of the current study.
Finally, the evaluation of the policies involved a combination of
normative judgments, dealing with values, and positive judgments,
dealing with facts and mechanisms operating in the world. Put diﬀer-
ently, the MCDA process attempts to answer the question: What would
be the likely outcomes under the diﬀerent policies considered, and
which of these outcomes would be preferable to others – and by how
much? This makes it diﬃcult to disentangle the role played by the
expert judgments regarding policy consequences from that played by
the normative judgments of the participant group: two individuals may
score the same policy diﬀerently on a speciﬁc criterion either because
they disagree on the eﬀects the policies would have in practice, or
because they agree on the eﬀects but disagree on the importance these
eﬀects should be given when deciding on a policy. Ideally, the two
issues should be separated fully so that the assumptions regarding
consequences could be surfaced. This could be achieved by ﬁrst de-
veloping a set of concise, written scenarios that describe, for speciﬁed
substances, the consequences and risks of each of the four regulatory
regimes for outcomes relevant to the diﬀerent criteria. Based on these,
diﬀerent participant groups reﬂecting diﬀerent stakeholders could
make their own normative judgments on each of the criteria and weight
these in accordance with their own ethical judgments.
Conclusions
We convened a decision conference over two one-and-a-half day
sessions, where a group of experts on the harms of drugs, addiction,
criminology and drug policy were led through a facilitated multi-cri-
teria decision analysis (MCDA) of drug policy in a Western context. This
is a process designed to help groups pool knowledge, deconstruct
complex issues into simpler judgments, and reconstruct overall judg-
ments in a way that promotes consistency, full consideration of all
concerns and alternatives, and a rigorous treatment of trade-oﬀs.
The participants generated a list of 27 criteria for assessing drug
policies, identifying a comprehensive set of ethical concerns held by the
group and familiar from broader drug policy debates. Using these, the
group deﬁned four regulatory regimes – full prohibition, decriminali-
sation, state control and free markets – and evaluated these four re-
gimes on the 27 criteria for alcohol and cannabis separately. By nor-
malising the 27 criterion-scales to a common scale, the “good” and
“bad” aspects of the diﬀerent policies could be compared and summed,
leading to an overall judgment that in both cases favoured state control.
This involved a departure from common policies implemented today:
for alcohol, the participant group preferred a stricter regulatory regime
with more regulation and government control than most countries have
today. For cannabis, however, a similarly strict regulatory regime in-
volves a less restrictive policy than the decriminalisation and strict
prohibition approaches that are currently in place.
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